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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OVER
A LOUISIANA PARTNERSHIP
Diversity jurisdiction of the federal judiciary is its power
to hear and adjudicate controversies between "Citizens of differ-
ent States."1 In United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bou-
ligny, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that an un-
incorporated association (there a labor union) is not a citizen
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The decision answers
most of the speculation that, since the case of Puerto Rico v.
Russell,3 the Court would recognize unincorporated bodies as
citizens for these purposes.4
In Russell, suit was brought against a Puerto Rican sociedad
en commandita.5 The Court ruled that the sociedad itself, not
its individual members, was the party defendant because in "the
tradition of the civil law, as expressed in the Code of Puerto
Rico, the sociedad is consistently regarded as a juridical per-
son."6 In view of Bouligny's limiting of Russell to its civilian
setting, the question arises whether the Bouligny result would
apply in litigation involving a Louisiana partnership.7
In cases involving multiple parties, the traditional rule is
that, for diversity jurisdiction to exist, there must be complete
diversity between all parties plaintiff, on the one hand, and all
parties defendant on the other -that is, no plaintiff can be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant.8 The applicability
of this rule to stockholders of corporations was denied in Louis-
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The statute governing diversity jurisdiction is
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1966).
2. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
3. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
4. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. The sociedad en commandita is a traditional civilian form of business
organization which may contain one or more general partners who carry on the
firm's business and are personally liable for debts of the firm. It is charac-
terized by the presence of partners en commandita, who contribute capital in
return for a share of the firm's earnings. In Russell the firm consisted solely
of partners en commandita, a structure more similar to the corporation than to
the common American partnership.
6. 288 U.S. 476, 480, 481 (1933).
7. The analysis in Russell rather than its holding is the concern of this Note,
for the case did not involve the question of diversity jurisdiction. See note 45
infra.
8. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) ; WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 24 (1963). For argument that this rule is not compelled by the United
States Constitution, see Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present,
and Future, 43 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 27 (1964). See also Supporting Memorandum
A, ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts:
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1965).
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ville R.R. v. Letson,9 and again in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R.,10 in which the Court constructed a fictive presumption
that all members of a corporation are citizens of the state of
incorporation - in effect, treating the corporation itself as a
citizen of the state. In 1958 Congress, in pursuit of a general
policy to restrict diversity jurisdiction," and taking a more
realistic view of the corporation, eliminated the "magic quality
of the corporate charter"'1 2 and made the corporation a citizen
of its principal place of business as well as its state of incor-
poration.' 3
The prospect that unincorporated bodies might receive treat-
ment similar to that given corporations was dashed by Chap-
man v. Barney in 1889.14 This landmark decision required com-
plete diversity with respect to all members of a joint stock com-
pany for diversity jurisdiction and has been applied to all un-
incorporated associations. The Chapman rule is derived from
the traditional common-law view of partnership as an aggre-
gate of individuals, 5 but persists even in cases arising in states
which provide by statute that for procedural, taxation, and other
purposes unincorporated associations are to be treated as cor-
porations.' 6 The refusal of federal courts to be bound by a
state's treatment of its unincorporated bodies is justified by
the fact that federal law, and not local law, determines whether
an association possesses citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.' 7
There is a clear inconsistency in the distinction drawn be-
tween corporate and unincorporated organizations. Function-
ally, an unincorporated association such as the American Ex-
press Co. or the United Steelworkers Union, may display all the
salient characteristics of personality of a corporation, yet Chap-
man severely restricts the availability to it of a federal forum.' 8
9. 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
10. 57 U.S. 314 (1853).
11. Scott, The Dual Citizenship of Corporations and Their Principal Place of
Business, 23 FED. B.J. 103, 117 (1963) ; Note, 44 MINN. L. REV. 308, 310 (1959).
12. Note, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 793, 794 (1966).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
14. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
15. See CRANE, THE LAW OF PAP.TNERSHIP 8-12, § 3 (1938).
16. See, e.g., Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (1960).
17. See Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1965).
18. It should be noted that we are leaving aside discussijn of the device some-
times used to defeat the requirement of complete diversity. This device is the
class action in which the representatives of the class who are named as parties
to the action are chosen so that diversity will exist as to them and, thereby, as
to the class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
19671 NOTES 349
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Since the 1958 extension of a corporation's "citizenship" to its
principal place of business, 19 the fact of a corporate charter
seems an outdated ground for distinction. The inconsistency has
greatly offended legal writers, and there has been a massive
clamor for a re-evaluation of Chapman.2 0
In some quarters the Russell decision had been hailed as a
revocation of the "unrealistic" Chapman rule- as indicative of
a trend toward treating unincorporated associations as citizens
for diversity purposes.21 To resolve conflicting decisions of the
Second 22 and the Fourth23 Circuits, the Court granted certiorari
in Bouligny.24 Although recognizing merit in the criticism of
Chapman,25 it found the question of changing the rule "properly
a matter for legislative consideration which cannot be ade-
quately or appropriately dealt with by this Court. '26 Recogni-
tion of the citizenship of an unincorporated labor union would
create practical difficulties "which we could not adequately re-
solve .... We should, for example, be obliged to fashion a test
for ascertaining of which State the labor union is a citizen. '27
More important, such a rule would enlarge diversity jurisdiction
and increase the volume of federal litigation, violating the con-
gressional policy of reducing diversity jurisdiction evident in
the expansion of corporate citizenship in 1958.28
In Bouligny the Court distinguished Russell as involving not
only a different legal question, but a unique civilian institution,
the sociedad en commandita. The question arises whether the
Louisiana partnership, with its civilian heritage, might be treated
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
20. See A.L.I. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Fed-
eral Courts: Proposed Final Draft No. 1 § 1301(b) (2) (1965) ; Laski, The
Personality of Association, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Magruder & Foster,
Jurisdiction over Partnerships, 38 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1924) Comment, 50
VA. L. REV. 1135 (1964) ; Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 138 (1965) Comment, 66
YALE L.J. 712 (1957) ; Note, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162 (1965) ; Note, 33 COLUM.
L. REV. 540 (1933); Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV., 793 (1966); Note, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1965) ; Note, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 102 (1930).
21. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964)
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.25, at 1413 (2d ed. 1964) ; Note, 33 COLUM L.
REV. 540 (1933).
22. Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
24. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
25. Id. at 150.
26. Id. at 147.
27. Id. at 152.
28. Comment, 6 UTAH L. REV. 231, 243 (1958). For discussion of the merits
of this policy see Comment, 51 VA. L. REV. 178 (1965); see also Moore &
Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAS L. REV.
1 (1964).
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as a juridical person 29 like the sociedad in Russell. The nature
of Louisiana's partnership suggests an affirmative answer.
Since the early case of Dick v. Byrne30 the partnership has been
treated as an entity by the courts:
"A partnership once formed and put into action becomes, in
contemplation of law, a moral being, distinct from the per-
sons who compose it. It is a civil person which has its pecul-
iar rights and attributes. Une personne fictive et morale
separ6e des associ6s. ' ' 31
This view compelled the now well-established rule that, during
the existence of the partnership, its suits can be maintained
by the firm alone, and litigation based on partnership obliga-
tions must. be brought against the firm and not against the in-
dividual partners.32
The conceptual distinction between the entity view and the
traditional common-law concept of partnership as a mere aggre-
gate of individuals suggests a logical ground for distinguishing
the Louisiana partnership from its common-law counterpart
and treating it as a citizen for diversity purposes. But a func-
tional comparison of the Louisiana commercial and ordinary
partnerships with their counterparts in other states compels
29. The word "partnership" is here used to refer to the comnercial and ordi-
nary partnerships recognized by the Louisiana Civil Code.
Art. 2825: "Commercial partnerships are such as are formed:
"1. For the purchase of any property and the sale thereof, either in the same
state or changed by manufacture.
"2. For buying or selling any personal property whatever, as factors or
brokers.
"3. For carrying personal property or passengers for hire, in ships, vessels,
or in any other vehicle of transportation."
Art. 2826: "Ordinary partnerships are all such as are not commercial.
The term "partnership" does not here include the partnership in comamendam,
Which LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2828 (1870) calls "a species of partnerships, which
may be incorporated with either of the other kinds .... ." Its nature requires
that it be considered separately from the commercial and ordinary partnerships.
30. 7 Rob. 465 (1844). The court accepted the view of the French commenta-
tor Toullier.
31. Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 52 La. Ann. 1357, 1365, 27
So. 893, 897 (1900).
32. O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LA. L. REV.
450, 462 (1949). See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 688 (1960) which says:
"A partnership has the procedural capacity to sue to enforce its rights in the
partnership name, and appears through and is represented by an authorized
partner."
The entity concept has been the basis for much jurisprudential law, both
substantive and procedural, and for the interpretation of statutes and contracts.
E.g., a member of a partnership, stied by his individual creditor, could not plead
in compensation a debt due by his creditor to the firm-nor could a creditor
seize the undivided interest of a partner in the firm. Smith v. MeMicken, 3 La.
Ann. 319 (1848).
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the conclusion that the differences are largely historical and
theoretical and that the federal courts will look beyond these to
apply the Chapman rule to them. 3
The basic statutory law governing partnership is found in
articles 2801-2890 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. These
provisions were taken largely from the French and remain vir-
tually unchanged since their promulgation in the Code of 1825.
When the articles were drafted, it was thought that a commer-
cial code would also be adopted. Consequently, although men-
tion was made of the "commercial" partnership,34 its detailed
regulation was left to the envisioned commercial code, and the
Civil Code established rules intended35 to apply to "ordinary"
partnership.36 With the failure of the legislature to adopt a
commercial code, the articles of the Civil Code were left as the
only rules governing partnership. But these provisions were
not designed to regulate the complexities of commercial deal-
ings and proved insufficient. Courts and lawyers were forced
to look to French, Spanish, and Anglo-American law for guid-
ance. At first the persuasiveness of the civilian commentators
was strong, but "by 1842 Anglo-American authorities definitely
had forged ahead of the other extra-Louisiana authorities cited
by Louisiana courts, never again to be overtaken. ' 37 Thus, it
is hardly surprising that the results reached by Louisiana courts
are substantially similar to those reached in other states.38 The
basic consequence of the entity theory, that partnership prop-
erty is owned by the firm itself and not by the individual part-
ners, is also the general result in Anglo-American jurisdictions. 39
Likewise, it is a general conclusion that partnership debts can-
not be compensated against the claims of an individual partner,
or the debts of an individual partner against partnership claims.
Nor do Louisiana courts adhere consistently to the entity con-
cept. In Dezendorf v. National Cas. Co.40 the court ignored the
33. For a thorough comparison of the Louisiana partnership with its counter-
part in Anglo-American law see O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of
Partnership, 9 LA. L. REV. 307 and 450 (1949).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2825 (1870).
35. O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LA. L. REV.
307, 308 (1949).
36. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2826 (1870).
37. O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LA. L. REV.
307, 317 (1949).
38. Id. at 456.
39. Ibid.
40. 171 So. 160 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). A partner brought an action in
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entity theory to reach a conclusion in accord with the rule in
other states. In view of the role into which the judiciary has
been thrust, that of providing a set of rules, in the absence of
sufficient legislation, to govern partnership activity, it seems
quite proper that courts should depart if necessary from a rig-
orous application of the entity concept to formulate just and
workable rules.
This practical search for solutions has occurred in the other
states. The treatment of the partnership as an entity has long
been common among commercial men and accountants, and is
now prevalent among courts and legislatures. 41
In view of the recognition given the entity concept by many
states,4 2 it seems improbable that Louisiana can be viewed as
an exceptional jurisdiction. Treatment of the Louisiana part-
nership as a citizen for diversity jurisdiction might open the
door to an ad hoc judicial examination of the law of each state
to determine whether that state's partnership deserves treat-
ment as a "citizen."
The effect of the scanty jurisprudence is that Louisiana part-
nerships will be subjected to the Chapman rule. The case of
Empire Rice Mill Co. v. K. & E. Neumond4 3 dismissed as un-
persuasive an earlier case treating a partnership as a citizen. 41
This strengthens the conclusion that Russell will not be con-
strued to make the Louisiana commercial or ordinary partner-
ship a citizen for diversity purposes.
However, some aspects of Russell are still relevant. Cer-
tainly the waves of implication created by dicta in Russell were
quieted by Bouligny. But the holding of Russell that the domi-
cile of partners en commandita has no effect on jurisdiction con-
tinues to be valid.45
tort against the partnership. Held, a partner cannot recover as an employee from
the partnership of which he is a member.
41. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 13 (2d ed. 1952).
42. The entity view is nowhere more patent than in State v. Pielsticker, 118
Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929) and Chisholm v. Chisholm Construction Co., 298
Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390 (1941).
43. 199 Fed. 800 (E.D. La. 1912).
44. Liverpool, Brazil, & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agor & Lelong, 14
Fed. 615 (E.D. La. 1882).
45. Ironically, Russell was not directly concerned with constitutional diversity
jurisdiction. It was not until the 1956 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was included in the term "states" for diversity
jurisdiction. The action was brought against the sociedad without naming its
members as defendants. The partners en commandita, all United States citizens,
1967]
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The Louisiana partnership in commendam46 is essentially the
same civilian institution as the sociedad en commandita involved
in Russell. The relation of the partner in commendam to the
firm is in the nature of that of a stockholder to his corpora-
tion.47 He is not personally liable for firm debts beyond his
contractual obligation to contribute to the firm.48  He may not
even be made a party to a suit against the partnership.49 Thus,
in a suit against a Louisiana partnership in commendam, under
the same reasoning as that in Russell, it will be only the citizen-
ship of the general partners which will determine whether di-
versity exists. This result, that the citizenship of partners in
commendam is irrelevant for determining jurisdiction, is the
essence of the Russell decision, and it would be the proper re-
sult in a suit against a Louisiana partnership in commendam.50
Cordell H. Haymon
removed the action to the federal district court under the Organic Act of Puerto
Rico, 48 U.S.C. § 863 (1958), which grants federal jurisdiction where all parties
on either side are United States citizens not domiciled in Puerto Rico. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the members were not "parties" within the meaning of
the Organic Act because the sociedad had independent citizenship in Puerto Rico,
and that the action was not removable to federal court. See Comment, 50 VA.
L. REV. 1135 (1964).
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2839 (1870) : "Partnership in commendam is formed
by a contract, by which one person or partnership agrees to furnish another
person or partnership a certain amount, either in property or money, to be em-
ployed by the person or partnership to whom it is furnished, in his or their own
name or firm, on condition of receiving a share in the profits, in the proportion
determined by the contract, and of being liable to losses and expenses to the
amount furnished and no more."
47. C. S. Burt & Co. v. Laplace, 114 La. 489, 38 So. 429 (1905).
48. The partner in commendam was colorfully described in Ullman & Co. v.
Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655, 659 (1880) as "a money lender, who
instead of permitting himself to be swayed by an illusion of cupidity, by em-
barking blindly in some hazardous enterprise or imprudent speculation, wisely
determines not to imperil himself and his property beyond well-defined limits."
49. In re M. F. Dunn & Brother, 115 La. 1084, 40 So. 466 (1906), which
held that the partner in commendam is not a real partner as to third parties and
was neither a necessary nor proper party to a suit against the firm because he is
not suable for firm debts. Of course if he has not paid into the firm to the
full extent of his contractual obligation, he may be sued for the part unpaid.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2842 (1870); De Lizardi v. Gossett, 1 La. Ann. 138 (N.O.
App. 1846).
50. The same result obtains in suits involving the limited partnership found
in other states, and derived from the French 8ocidt en commendite. Under the
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 26, the
limited partner is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership,
except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against a liability
to the partnership. 38 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. § 115 (McKinney 1966).
The conclusion has been recently confirmed in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
& Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). In that action by a customer against a
brokerage firm, where there was diversity between the customer and all general
partners, identity of citizenship between the customer and a limited partner of
the broker was not fatal to diversity jurisdiction.
